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THE	JACKSON	REPORT	ON	AUSTRALIAN	AID:	THE	UNDERLYING	FRAMEWORK	
David	Lim*	
Introduction	
In	late	April	1983,	Mr	Bill	Hayden,	the	Australian	Foreign	Minister,	set	up	an	independent	
committee	under	the	chairmanship	of	Sir	Gordon	Jackson	to	review	the	Australian	overseas	
aid	program.1	The	report	of	the	committee	was	tabled	in	Parliament	on	7	June	1984.2	In	the	
subsequent	public	debate	on	the	Jackson	Report,	it	became	clear	that	the	committee's	
position	on	various	key	issues	on	aid	and	development	was	often	misrepresented.	
The	misrepresentation	could	have	been	deliberate	because	the	report	adopted	a	strategy	of	
development	that	was	not	universally	accepted.	It	could	also	have	been	because	the	
analytical	framework	adopted	was	not	presented	explicitly.	The	need	to	keep	the	report	to	a	
manageable	size	and	the	large	number	of	issues	that	had	to	be	covered,	under	the	very	
wide	terms	of	reference,	might	also	have	resulted	in	too	terse	a	treatment	of	some	of	the	
central	issues.	This	paper	attempts	to	provide	the	analytical	framework	of	the	Jackson	
Report	and	to	examine	within	this	some	of	the	important	issues	of	aid	and	development.	
Analytical	Framework	
Aim	of	Official	Development	Assistance	
The	Jackson	Report	took	as	its	starting	point	the	widely	held	view	that	the	aim	of	aid	is	to	
help	bring	about	the	economic	development	of	the	recipient	less	developed	countries	
(LDCs),	and	so	in	due	course	for	these	countries	to	become	independent	of	the	need	for	aid.	
Economic	development	is	defined	as	sustained	economic	growth,	with	a	lowering	of	the	
incidence	of	poverty	and	a	reduction	in	income	inequality.	This	is	also	seen	to	include	
fundamental	changes	in	the	social	fabric	of	the	recipient	LDCs.	
Aid	designed	for	economic	development	is	known	as	official	development	assistance	(ODA)	
and	is	not	the	same	as	emergency	aid,	which	is	given	to	cope	with	the	effects	of	an	
unexpected	disaster.	It	is	also	different	from	help	granted	in	situations	where	prolonged	
oppression	and	neglect	have	left	communities	in	a	state	of	deprivation	indistinguishable	
from	that	brought	about	by	sudden	disasters.	
Reasons	for	Giving	Aid	
Why	do	developed	countries	(DCs)	such	as	Australia	give	aid	to	LDCs	so	as	to	enhance	the	
development	of	the	latter?	Three	reasons	have	been	identified	from	the	literature,	the	sub-	
missions	from	the	Australian	public,	and	the	discussions	that	the	committee	had	with	
representatives	of	interested	parties.	The	first	is	humanitarian,	in	which	the	interests	of	the	
recipient	LDCs	are	paramount	and	any	other	consequences	incidental.3	The	humanitarian	
reason	for	giving	aid	is	the	geographical	extension	of	the	widely	held	principle	within	
Australia	that	the	rich	have	a	moral	obligation	to	help	the	poor.	
The	second	reason	is	that	it	serves	the	political	interests	of	the	donor	country.	If	aid	
succeeds	in	promoting	economic	development,	it	is	likely	to	enhance	the	standing	of	
Australia	in	the	eyes	of	the	decision-makers	and	populations	of	the	recipient	LDC.	This	is	
particularly	desirable	if	the	LDCs	concerned	are	strategically	important	to	Australia,	as	it	is	
better	to	have	friends	rather	than	enemies	in	one's	geo-political	sphere	of	concern.4	If	
regional	stability	contributes	to	global	stability,	then	the	impact	will	be	even	greater	and	
may	also	earn	the	donor	country	the	respect	of	other	donor	countries	and	the	world	
community	generally.	The	political	reason	for	giving	aid	is	particularly	important	to	
Australia,	located	as	it	is,	unlike	most	other	donor	countries,	in	an	area	of	under-	
development.	
The	third	reason	for	giving	aid	is	economic	gain	for	the	donor	country.	Successful	economic	
development	in	the	recipient	LDCs	produces	richer	and	more	stable	neighbours	and	trading	
partners	and	so	expands	the	market	for	the	exports	of	the	donor	country.	There	will	also	be	
increased	opportunities	for	direct	foreign	investment	by	the	donor	country.	These	export	
and	investment	opportunities	will	be	enhanced	by	the	establishment	of	on-going	contacts	
between	Australian	aid	participants	and	decision-makers	in	the	recipient	LDCs,	and	by	a	
greater	awareness	in	these	countries	of	Australian	capabilities.	These	are	essentially	long-
term	and	indirect	economic	arguments	for	aid	and	require	that	Australia	is	able	to	sell	its	
goods	and	services	at	world	prices	before	the	commercial	gains	can	be	realized.		
A	form	of	economic	argument	for	aid	that	is	often	heard	is	that	Australian	investment,	
output	and	employment	will	be	stimulated	when	Australian	resources	are	used	in	the	aid	
program	itself.	This	is	the	same	as	the	long-term	and	indirect	argument	if	Australian	goods	
and	services	are	internationally	competitive,	or	are	not	so	only	because	their	competitors	
have	been	unfairly	subsidized.	If	not,	the	argument	degenerates	into	one	of	tied	aid,	with	
the	funds	used	to	increase	the	demand	for	Australian	goods	and	services	and	not	to	bring	
about	the	economic	development	of	the	recipient	LDCs.	This	is	an	argument	that	is	not	
acceptable	to	the	Jackson	Committee.	
Conflicts	of	Mandates	
The	Jackson	Committee	accepts	that	in	Australia,	as	in	other	donor	countries,	there	is	more	
than	one	mandate	for	giving	aid	for	development.	It	also	recognizes	that	the	humanitarian,	
political	and	economic	mandates	can	give	rise	to	quite	different	groups	of	LDCs	being	
helped.	For	example,	humanitarian	concern	will	dictate	that	Australian	aid	be	distributed	to	
the	poorest	LDCs	of	the	world,	whereas	political	or	foreign	policy	considerations	will	favour	
those	LDCs	which	are	closer,	and	of	more	strategic	importance,	to	Australia.	For	Australia	
the	strategically	important	LDCs	do	not	number	among	the	poorest	of	the	world.	
There	can	also	be	a	conflict	between	the	humanitarian	and	the	commercial	reasons.	The	
latter	would	undoubtedly	lead	to	Australian	aid	being	channelled	to	the	richer	of	the	LDCs	
and	to	those	with	a	proven	economic	performance.	These	countries'	demand	for	Australian	
goods	and	services	will	exceed	that	emanating	from	the	group	of	LDCs,	the	poorest	of	the	
poor,	favoured	by	humanitarian	considerations.	
Commercial	and	political	concerns	do	not	always	lead	to	the	same	target	LDCs,	in	spite	of	
both	serving	the	self-interest	of	the	donor	country.	LDCs	which	are	of	strategic	significance	
to	Australia	are	not	necessarily	those	with	the	largest	demand	for	its	goods	and	services.	
A	Complementary	Approach	
Given	that	there	are	several	mandates	for	aid	and	that	these	do	not	necessarily	result	in	the	
same	target	groups	of	LDCs,	the	Jackson	Committee	emphasized	the	need	for	the	related	
interests	to	operate	in	a	complementary	rather	than	a	competitive	environment.	Three	
steps	were	adopted	in	arriving	at	such	a	complementary	approach.	
The	first	is	to	divide	LDCs	into	four	categories,	the	first	being	the	most	important,	the	fourth	
the	least.	These	categories	are:	
i) Papua	New	Guinea	and	the	small	island	states	of	the	Pacific	and	Indian	Oceans;	
ii) South-East	Asia	and	the	small	states	of	South	Asia	(Bhutan,	Nepal	and	Sri	Lanka);	
iii) China,	India,	Pakistan	and	Bangladesh;		
iv) Other	LDCs.	
At	one	level	such	a	geographical	focus	may	be	seen	as	according	most	importance	to	the	
political	and	strategic	interests.	However,	the	Australian	aid	program	is	very	small	and	even	
if	this	were	to	be	increased	very	substantially,	there	would	still	be	far	more	poverty	in	the	
world	than	Australia	could	ever	hope	to	alleviate.	Spreading	the	limited	aid	funds	very	thinly	
over	a	large	number	of	LDCs	is	not	going	to	do	anybody	much	good.	The	committee	took	the	
view	that	there	will	have	to	be	a	geographical	concentration	and	saw	no	reason	why	foreign	
policy	considerations	should	not	hold	sway	at	this	level	of	broad	policy.	
The	second	step	is	to	resist	attempts	to	use	aid	to	stimulate	Australian	business,	when	it	is	
internationally	uncompetitive.	To	not	do	so	would	be	to	condone	the	introduction	of	major	
distortions	into	the	aid	selection	process,	which	would	ultimately	retard	the	development	
process	itself.	The	position	taken	by	the	Jackson	Report	is	the	firm	one	that	aid	policy	
cannot	be	trade	or	industry	policy.	
This	stance	is	not	contradicted	by	the	proposed	increase	in	funds	for	the	Development	
Import	Finance	Facility	(DIFF).	Under	the	revamped	Australian	Development	Assistance	
Bureau	(ADAB),	DIFF	will	be	given	only	to	those	Australian	firms	and	industries	which	are	
internationally	competitive,	but	which	cannot	do	well	in	the	export	markets	only	because	
their	Japanese,	American	or	British	counterparts	are	highly	subsidized	by	the	mixed	credits	
offered	by	their	governments.	
The	third	step	is	to	ensure	that	the	development	strategy	supported	and	practiced	by	ADAB	
bring	about	growth	with	equity.	This	is	a	highly	controversial	issue	and	the	debate	on	it	has	
gone	through	a	number	of	stages.	In	the	1950s	and	the	early	1960s,	it	was	believed	that	
rapid	economic	growth	would	create	enough	jobs	to	reduce	the	level	of	labour	under-	
utilization	and	so	to	decrease	the	incidence	of	poverty	and,	if	not	to	reduce	income	
inequality,	to	at	least	not	worsen	it.	Towards	the	end	of	the	1960s	it	became	clear	that	
economic	growth	did	not	automatically	bring	about	greater	employment	opportunities	and	
equity.	This	prompted	some	to	argue	that	LDCs	must	go	through	a	stage	of	increasing	
inequality	with	economic	growth,	before	things	could	begin	to	look	up	for	the	poor.	LDCs	
were,	in	fact,	told	that	they	had	to	learn	how	to	walk	(grow)	first,	before	they	could	run	
(redistribute).	Ela-	borate	economic	theories	were	invoked	or	introduced	to	support	this	but	
they	were	based	largely	on	the	simple	premises	that	economic	growth	requires	capital	
formation	and	that	the	rich	will	provide	this	because	they	have	what	it	takes.	
The	evidence	also	moved	some	to	argue	that	equity	must	precede	economic	growth.	
Workers	must	feel	that	they	belong	to,	and	benefit	from,	the	system	before	they	will	give	it	
their	support.	The	rich	in	the	LDCs	of	today	are	not	known	for	their	20	propensity	to	save	in	
either	their	own	or	foreign	countries.	A	growth	strategy	based	on	substantial	or	growing	
inequality	under	such	circumstances	may	be	nothing	more	than	a	cynical	move	to	
perpetuate	the	vested	interests	of	the	economic	and	political	elites	of	the	LDCs.	
By	the	early	1980s,	when	more	studies	using	more	reliable	data	and	more	sophisticated	
methods	became	available,	the	balance	of	the	evidence	suggests	that	economic	growth	is	
neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	the	incidence	of	poverty	or	income	inequality	to	decline.	
They	also	point	out	that	the	incidence	of	poverty	may	decrease	while	income	inquality	
increases,	with	or	without	economic	growth.	In	other	words,	economic	growth	per	se	will	
not	automatically	increase	the	incidence	of	poverty	and	income	inequality.	It	is	the	way	in	
which	that	growth	is	brought	about	that	matters.	For	example,	a	very	rapid	rate	of	industrial	
growth	can	be	obtained	by	pursuing	an	import-substituting	and	capital-intensive	program	
under	an	over-valued	exchange	rate,	high	tariffs	and	subsidies	for	capital,	but	its	impact	on	
employment	would	be	negligible	and	the	effect	on	distribution	adverse.	On	the	other	hand,	
equally	rapid	growth	can	be	achieved	by	opting	for	a	labour-	intensive	and	low-technology	
program.	More	jobs	will	be	created	and	the	goods	produced	will	be	more	likely	to	be	
internationally	competitive	as	they	make	greater	use	of	the	available	abundant	resources.	
The	position	taken	by	the	Jackson	Committee	is	that	the	debate	over	the	power	of	
economic	growth	per	se	to	do	this	or	that	has	not	been	useful	as	it	has	missed	the	crucial	
point	about	the	process	and	the	effect	of	economic	growth.	The	develop-	ment	strategy	
which	it	believes	will	bring	about	growth	with	equity	in	LDCs	with	mixed	economies	would	
include	the	following	elements:	
- Realistic	exchange	and	interest	rates	encourage	invest-	ment,	production	and	
exports;	taxes	which	provide	revenues	to	create	public	infrastructure;	and	wages	
which	reflect	productivity.	
- Health	and	education	receive	high	priority.	Public	ownership	and	private	
entrepreneurship	are	balanced,	with	competitive	markets	in	which	prices	reflect	
scarcities.	
- Equity	considerations	are	given	proper	weight,	mainly	through	job	creation	and	
through	programs	designed	to	increase	productivity	of	farmers	and	other	self-
employed	people,	and	through	the	provision	of	water,	power	and	other	public	goods	
for	the	poorer	sections	of	the	community.	
- Institutions	which	work	well,	ensuring	the	efficient	operation	of	the	social,	legal	and	
physical	infrastructure	of	the	nation.	
- Prices	are	kept	stable.5	
These	are	requirements	which	apply	whether	the	LDCs	are	big	or	small,	richly	or	poorly	
endowed,	land	or	water-locked,	Christian	or	Islamic,	white	or	black.	Most	of	the	
characteristics	are	present	in	those	LDCs	which	have	achieved	high	rates	of	economic	
growth	and	raised	the	standards	of	living	of	most	of	their	populations.	Of	equal	importance	
is	the	fact	that	the	policies	are	within	the	power	of	sovereign	nations	to	introduce	and	to	
maintain,	provided	that	the	political	will	is	there.	Far	too	often	the	LDCs	have	conveniently	
forgotten	that	the	major	determinant	of	development	is	the	domestic	environment	and	not	
the	international	economy.	
In	sum,	then,	the	framework	adopted	by	the	Jackson	Committee	is	to	see	the	aim	of	aid	as	
the	economic	development	of	the	recipient	LDCs	and	to	have	as	reasons	for	giving	such	aid	
humanitarian	concern	and	political	and	economic	self-interest.	The	approach	taken	in	
formulating	the	Australian	aid	program	within	this	broad	framework	is	to	first	rank	the	
recipient	LDCs,	largely	in	the	order	of	their	importance	to	the	strategic	interests	of	Australia.	
Once	this	has	been	done,	the	aid	is	to	be	used	to	enhance	the	economic	development	of	the	
targetted	LDCs.	
This	is	to	be	done	by	not	tying	the	aid	to	Australian	goods	and	services	when	these	are	
internationally	uncompetitive,	to	grant	'mixed	credits'	only	to	counter	unfair	competition,	
and	to	participate	in	projects	which	will	bring	about	growth	with	equity.	These	conditions	
can	only	be	fulfilled	if	the	recommendations	of	the	Jackson	Committee	for	a	more	
independent	and	professional	aid	administration	are	accepted.	The	first	requirement	is	
needed	to	withstand	the	pressure	from	the	private	sector.	The	second	is	necessary	to	
identify	the	areas	in	which	Australia	can	best	help	and	where	and	when	'mixed	credits'	are	
justified,	and	to	ensure,	as	much	as	is	scientifically	and	diplomatically	possible,	that	
Australian	aid	goes	only	into	projects	which	contribute	to	the	economic	development	of	the	
recipient	LDC.	
Aid	and	Economic	Development	
By	adopting	such	a	framework	of	analysis,	the	Jackson	Committee	has	implicitly	assumed	
that	aid	can	help	to	accelerate	the	economic	development	of	the	recipient	LDCs.	It	believes	
the	argument	that	aid	is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	development	to	be	over-stated,	
that	it	has	credibility	only	in	cases	where	the	development	policies	of	the	recipient	LDCs	and	
the	aid	policies	of	the	donor	countries	have	been	equally	bad,	and	where	the	amount	of	aid	
is	small,	fragmented	and	not	sustained.	
We	have	already	discussed	the	Jackson	Committee's	views	on	the	policies	required	in	LDCs	
to	produce	an	environment	in	which	savings	and	investment	are	encouraged,	the	allocation	
of	resources	efficient,	and	the	distribution	of	the	benefits	of	growth	equitable.	Into	such	a	
system,	properly	designed	and	implemented	foreign	aid	can	play	a	positive	role	in	
augmenting	saving,	foreign	exchange	and	human	capital	in	the	recipient	LDCs	and	so	
enhance	their	economic	development.	
The	approach	taken	by	the	Jackson	Committee	to	produce	an	effective	Australian	aid	
program	is	to	first	make	it	more	focused	by	country,	sector	and	instrument	of	delivery,	so	
that	the	aid	effort	is	not	dissipated	by	doing	too	many	things	in	too	many	ways	and	in	too	
many	places,	with	scant	regard	for	the	modest	size	of	Australia's	aid	budget	and	for	its	
comparative	advantages.	Focussing	the	aid	program	by	sector	and	instrument	of	delivery	is	
especially	important	in	those	large	LDCs	where	the	Australian	input	is	relatively	insignificant	
as	it	helps	to	make	the	most	of	Australia's	contribution	at	the	margin.	
Within	this	focussed	approach	to	aid,	country	programming,	forward	budgeting,	proper	
formulation,	implementation	and	monitoring	of	projects,	and	post-evaluation	studies	were	
recommended.	The	aim	is	to	ensure	that	the	aid	given	produces	efficiency	(the	degree	to	
which	the	costs	incurred	result	in	benefits),	effectiveness	(the	extent	to	which	it	fits	into	the	
recipient	LDCs	program),	and	impact	(the	way	in	which	the	aid	affects	the	social	and	
economic	development	of	the	recipient	LDC).	
The	Jackson	Committee	believes	that	the	greatest	impact	Australian	aid	can	make	is	not	by	
concentrating	it	on	'grass	roots'	programs.	It	is	obtained	by	helping	to	expand	and	upgrade	
the	physical	and	human	infrastructure	of	the	recipient	LDCs.	The	lack	of	such	facilities	
results	in	severe	development	bottlenecks	and	an	aid	program	which	emphasises	the	pro-	
vision	of	basic	needs	does	little	to	remove	these	constraints	and	to	bring	about	sustained	
development.	In	any	case,	the	basic	needs	of	food,	shelter,	clothing,	education	and	health	
can	be	provided	by	most	LDCs,	including	the	poorest.	Where	such	needs	have	not	been	
provided,	then	growth	with	equity	policies	have	not	been	pursued	either	deliberately	or	
through	ignorance.	An	aid	program,	especially	one	on	the	modest	scale	of	the	Australian	
one,	that	attempts	to	substitute	for	such	domestic	responsibilities	can	only	have	a	
peripheral	effect.	
Where	large-scale	and	capital-intensive	infrastructural	aid	projects	with	long	gestation	
periods	result	in	a	worsening	in	income	inequality,	attempts	should	be	made	by	either	the	
host	government	or	the	donor	country	working	through	other.	agencies	to	ensure	that	basic	
needs	are	provided.	Efforts	should	also	be	made	to	adapt	the	technology	to	suit	local	
conditions.	
The	infrastructural	activities	with	which	Australian	aid	should	be	involved	are	those	in	which	
Australia	has	a	comparative	advantage	and	for	which	there	is	a	need	in	the	recipient	LDCs.	
This	double	requirement	is	not	easy	to	satisfy	but	should	be	sought	because	the	aim	of	aid	is	
economic	development	and	the	days	of	gunboat	diplomacy	and	aid	have	long	gone.	The	
acceptance	of	the	fact	that	donor	countries	can	no	longer	force,	at	will,	recipient	LDCs	to	do	
as	bidden	and	the	recognition	that	not	all	of	the	recipient	LDCs	pursue	growth	with	equity	
policies	make	the	need	for	a	properly	planned	and	implemented	aid	program	by	the	donor	
country	all	the	more	necessary.	
These	recommendations	on	making	aid	more	effective	in	economic	development	can	be	
implemented	and	the	expected	results	materialized	only	if	the	aid	administrative	system	is	
strengthened.	In	many	ways	the	most	important	part	of	the	Jackson	Report	is	the	section	on	
aid	administration	and	management.	Without	a	more	efficient	and	professional	ADAB,	the	
aid	program	may	continue	to	be	assessed	in	terms	of	the	number	of	bridges	and	roads	built,	
the	number	of	overseas	students	trained	in	Australia,	the	amount	of	food	aid	given,	and	the	
number	of	wells	dug,	without	much	regard	for	the	way	in	which	these	activities	interact	
with	each	other	and	with	the	other	programs	carried	out	by	the	recipient	LDC.	
Concluding	Remarks	
The	underlying	framework	adopted	by	the	Jackson	Report	demands	that	Australian	aid	
helps	to	increase	the	economic	development	of	the	recipient	LDCs.	If	it	does	not,	then	the	
humanitarian,	political	and	economic	arguments	for	giving	aid	lose	much	of	their	cogency	
and	force.	
To	begin	with,	the	foreign	policy	argument,	which	largely	decides	the	total	and	the	type	of	
aid	that	different	LDCs	should	receive,	would	be	called	into	question.	The	standing	of	
Australia	would	obviously	be	very	high	in	the	eyes	of	the	elite	of	the	recipient	LDC.	
However,	this	advantage	will	only	be	temporary	as	rising	absolute	and	relative	poverty,	with	
or	without	economic	growth,	will	sooner	or	later	force	the	ruling	party	out	of	power.	When	
that	happens,	Australia	will	have	either	no	influence	or	an	enemy	for	life.	Even	if	the	ruling	
regime	were	able	to	hang	on	for	a	long	time,	there	will	be	increased	political	uncertainty.	
These	are	consequences	that	Australia	does	not	want	in	LDCs	in	its	area	of	geo-political	
concern.	Moreover,	the	humanitarian	mandate	will	have	been	violated,	which	does	not	
accord	with	the	declared	complementary	approach	of	the	Jackson	Committee.	
If	the	aid	does	not	produce	economic	development,	the	economic	argument	for	aid	can	only	
be	sustained	in	the	short-	run.	Those	who	benefit	from	increasing	income	inequality	have	a	
higher	propensity	to	import	and	are	more	likely	to	invest	and	bank	overseas	as	well	as	
spend	their	holidays	there.	The	donor	country	can	benefit	from	this	if	it	is	internationally	
competitive.	However,	in	the	longer	term,	when	social	and	political	upheaval	produces	
another	regime,	the	gains	will	have	been	lost.	World	trade	may	also	contract	as	the	new	
regime	is	likely	to	be	more	inward-looking.	
The	approach	taken	by	the	Jackson	Committee	has	been	attacked	from	different	directions.	
There	are	some	who	argue	that	it	has	oversold	the	role	of	aid	in	development,	that	aid	may	
indeed	retard	development,	so	that	the	humanitarian	mandate	for	aid	is	no	more	than	an	
opportunity	for	self-glorification,	and	the	search	for	political	and	economic	gains—a	game	in	
self-deception.	There	are	those	who	argue	that	aid	does	enhance	development	but	only	if	
different	economic	development	and	aid	strategies	are	adopted.	And	there	are	those	who	
see	aid	mainly	as	another	source	of	demand	for	Australian	goods	and	services,	with	the	
development	of	the	recipient	LDCs	coincidental	or	secondary.	
None	of	the	critics	has	a	monopoly	of	knowledge	about	aid	and	economic	development	and	
neither	has	the	Jackson	Committee.	What	it	has	done	is	to	marshall	the	various	arguments	
into	a	framework	which	allows	the	different	interest-groups	in	the	country	to	work	in	a	
complementary	way,	so	that	Australian	aid	can	contribute	meaningfully	to	the	economic	
development	of	the	poor	countries	of	the	world,	particularly	those	in	its	area	of	geo-political	
concern.	
	
[Footnote]	
*	 Professor,	School	of	Modern	Asian	Studies,	Griffith	University	and	member,	the	
Committee	to	Review	the	Australian	Overseas	Aid	Program.	
1. Sir	Gordon	is	the	Deputy	Chairman	of	C.S.R.	Ltd	and	was	its	General	Manager	from	1972	
to	1982.	He	has	been	a	member	of	the	Board	of	the	Reserve	Bank	of	Australia	since	1975	
and	was	the	chairman	of	the	Commonwealth	Government's	Consultative	Committee	on	
Relations	with	Japan	for	1978-81.	The	Deputy	Chair-	person	was	Professor	Helen	
Hughes,	Executive	Director	of	the	Development	Studies	Centre,	Australian	National	
University,	who	was	the	Director	of	the	Economic	Analysis	and	Projections	Department	
of	the	World	Bank,	and	has	carried	out	consultancy	work	for	business,	governments	and	
international	agencies.	Other	members	of	the	committee	were	Neil	Batt,	Resident	
Director	of	the	TNT	Group	of	Companies	for	Victoria	and	Tasmania,	who	was	the	
National	President	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party	(1978-80)	and	the	National	Chairman	of	
the	Australian	Council	for	Overseas	Aid	(1975-78);	Professor	David	Lim,	School	of	
Modern	Asian	Studies,	Griffith	University	and	a	consultant	to	the	World	Bank,	ILO,	
UNCTAD	and	other	UN	agencies;	Dr	Peter	McCawley,	Head	of	the	Indonesian	Project,	
Research	School	of	Pacific	Studies,	Australian	National	University,	and	a	consultant	to	
the	World	Bank	and	other	international	agencies;	and	Dr	Brian	Scott,	Chairman	and	
Managing	Director	of	W.	D.	Scott	and	Co.	Pty	Ltd,	a	member	of	the	Trade	Development	
Council	since	1978	and	of	the	Committee	on	Australia's	Relations	with	the	Third	World	
(1978-79).	Mr	Peter	Hastings,	Foreign	Editor	of	the	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	was	
appointed	as	a	member	but	withdrew	before	the	committee	met.		
2. Report	of	the	Committee	to	Review	the	Australian	Overseas	Aid	Program	(Australian	
Government	Publishing	Service,	Canberra,	1984);	hereafter	known	as	The	Jackson	
Report.		
3. This	view	is	expressed	very	strongly	by	the	voluntary	aid	agencies,	also	known	as	the	
non-government	organisations,	most	of	which	believe	it	the	only	justification	for	giving	
aid.		
4. The	argument	that	geo-political	interests	have	a	role	to	play	in	the	Australian	aid	
program	is	found	even	among	some	voluntary	aid	agencies.	For	example,	the	submission	
from	Community	Aid	Abroad,	Aid	to	the	Poorest:	Justice	not	Charity,	stated	that	'the	
goal	of	the	Australian	development	assistance	program	should	be	the	elimination	of	
chronic	poverty	and	its	causes	within	Australia's	geo-cultural	sphere	of	concern,	p.	7.	
5. The	Jackson	Report,	p.	30.		
